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ABSTRACT
In 2016, both the election of President Trump and the UK's vote to
leave the European Union represented important shifts in the
approach ofboth countries to their international trading relationships.
In the case of the US, the Trump administration has sought to target
tariffs against countries such as China, while the UK is seeking to exit
a highly integrated market and also assert its sovereignty. In this
article, it is shown that both events were a response to the China
import shock, which in turn led to a dramatic rise inpopulism resulting
in a substantive shift in each country's trade policy, each generating
substantive actual and expected economic costs. However, the policy
responses to populism are quite different: the US has chosen to be
explicitly protectionist, a feature of economic nationalism, while the
UK is not seeking to raise trade barriers as it adjusts its trading
arrangements. Nonetheless, both countries are following a path of
economic "dis-integration, " the US undermining its multilateral
obligations under the WTO, the UK seeking to leave the European
Union ofwhich it has been a member since 1973.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The world trading system currently faces two major
challenges: the first is President Trump's ongoing trade war with
China, and other targeted countries such as Japan;' the second is the
UK's exit, in some form, from the European Union (EU), commonly
referred to as "Brexit." 2 While apparently related to quite different
issues, there are clear similarities between escalation of the trade war
by the current US administration and the UK's departure from the EU.
One similarity relates to the underlying drivers that contributed in 2016
to the election of Donald Trump and the majority decision in the UK
referendum to leave the EU: each of these can be tied to the rapid
growth in globalization in the last two decades following China's entry
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In addition, issues
arising from the China import shock were then exacerbated in the
aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, notably the lack of a
comprehensive US social safety net and the deliberate policy of
economic austerity adopted by the UK government, which contributed
to the measured increase in economic inequality in both countries.
4
At the same time, careful interpretation of the apparently
different policy choices of the US and UK also points to other
underlying similarities. Common to both the US and UK is the
derogation of current international and regional trading commitments
and the desire to "take control" of national trade policies.
5 In the case
of the US, recent trade policy developments have focused on reducing
adherence to multilateral trade rules and targeting specific countries
1 See Meredith A. Crowley, Introduction to TRAD WAR: TE CLASH OF ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS ENDANGERING GLOBAL PROSPERITY, I (Meredith A. Crowley ed., 2019)
(ebook), https:H/voxeu.org/content/trade-war-clash-economic-systems-threatening-
global-prosperity.
2 See Thomas Sampson, Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration, 31
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 163, 163 (2017).
3See David H. Autor et al., The ChinaSyndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of
Import Competition in the UnitedStates, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2121-22
(2013); see Italo Colantone & Piero Stanig, Global Competition and Brexit, 112
AM. POL. SCi REV. 201, 201 (2018).
4 See Pol Antrds et al., Globalization, Inequality and Welfare, 108 J. INT'L ECON.
387, 387 (2017); Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, I J.
INT'L Bus. POLICY 12,16-18 (2018).
-See Csongor Istvin Nagy, World Trade, Imperial Fantasies and Protectionism:




with tariffs, even if the consequence of this is to provoke a global trade
war. The UK's departure from the EU is also predicated on national
sovereignty issues: the unwillingness to be bound by EU rules and the
desire to establish its own free trade agreements (FTAs). Both cases
involve disengagement from arrangements that have been long-
standing; and both will have consequences for other countries and,
despite the rhetoric concerning the expected gains associated with
economic nationalism, both the US and UK will likely face significant
economic losses, as a consequence of these decisions.
One important difference between economic assessments of
the US trade war with China and the UK's departure from the EU is
that the former is associated with de-globalization as reflected in
President Trump's labeling of US trade decisions as "America First."
In contrast, supporters of Brexit, and UK politicians leading the debate
over Brexit, have never claimed to be against globalization; indeed,
the desire to seek new trade agreements post-departure from the EU is
testament o a desire to promote trade with non-EU countries and also
to have an acceptable post-Brexit trade agreement with the EU.9The
paradox of this position is that the UK is leaving the world's largest
trading bloc, where UK trade with EU countries accounts for, by far,
the most important source and destination for its imports and exports,
intra-EU trade being facilitated by zero border tariffs and common
standards. Therefore, on face value, while current US and UK trade
policy choices appear different, and notwithstanding the nuances, there
are common themes relating to both the underlying drivers and the
likely consequences of these policy choices.
The aim of this article is to explore the issue of economic
nationalism as reflected in the trade policy decisions being made by
both the US and UK. Part II of the article focuses on the logic of
economic nationalism and its connection to populism, while in Part III
6 See Aaditya Mattoo & Robert W. Staiger, Trade Wars: What Do They Mean?
Why are They Happening Now? What are the Costs? 2 (World Bank Grp.,
Working Paper No. 8829, 2019).
7 See Jennifer Johns, Britain Fails to Understand the Nature ofGlobalization at its
Peril, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 5, 2016), https://theconversation.com/ britain-
fails-to-understand-the-nature-of-globalisation-at-its-peril-61392.
See Charles Hankla, What Does "America First" Meanfor American Economic
Interest?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 1, 2017), https:// theconversation.com/what-
does-america-first-mean-for-american-economic-interests-71931.
See fain Mansfield, A Blueprintfor Britain: Openness not Isolation, INST. FOR
ECON. AFF., 3 (2014), https://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications
/files/Brexit%20Entry%2 0170_finalbio web.pdf.
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of the article we explore the commonality of the China import shock
as it has affected the US and UK economies. Then in Part IV, we
sketch out the economic response of both the US and UK; while the
nature of response is clearly more definitive in the case of the US,
given that President Trump has already initiated the imposition of
tariffs, in the case of the UK, the possible choices, such as they are at
the time of writing, are still on the table awaiting the political process
to reach a conclusion. We survey recent assessments of the costs of
trade policy choices made by the US and (still to be made) by the UK
in Part V of the article, which is then followed by a summary and some
concluding remarks in Part VI.
II. THE LOGIC OF EcONOMIC NATIONALISM
As we discuss in detail in Section III, trade liberalization and
more broadly globalization can create both economic winners and
losers, i.e., consumers and resources employed in the export-
competing sectors of an economy gain while resources such as less-
skilled labor employed in the import-competing sectors of an economy
suffer the costs of job displacement and reduced incomes. 
0 From the
perspective of cost-benefit analysis, it is straightforward to
demonstrate the gains from trade by appealing to the so-called Kaldor-
Hicks compensation principle. Specifically, as long as benefits oftrade
liberalization outweigh the losses, in principle it is possible for the
winners to compensate the losers and still be better off, i.e., there is the
potential for a Pareto improvement whereby some agents in the
economy are made better off without the remaining agents being made
any worse off."
The obvious problem with this principle is highlighted when
compensation of the losers is either insufficient or does not actually
occur. As we will argue in the remainder of the Section, this creates
the potential for populism to gain ground, the political outcome being
economic nationalism, i.e., opposition to free trade and increased
isolationism, reduction of the welfare state through laissez faire
domestic economic policies, and a strong nationalist stance.
12
loSee Rodrik, supra note 4, at 17-18.
" See Antras et al., supra note 4, at 388.
12 See Italo Colantone & Piero Stanig, The Trade Origins of Economic
Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe, 62 AM.
J. Pol.. SCL 936, 936 (2018).
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Given the extent of trade liberalization and globalization in the
post-war period, an obvious question is why did economic nationalism
not appear earlier in developed economies? The answer to this has
been widely discussed in the political science literature. Essentially,
developed countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) absorbed two key lessons from the inter-
war period: first, protectionist trade policies had the potential to
undermine the world trading system, hence the commitment to
multilateral governance of that system through the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and second, this commitment came with
the recognition by policymakers that they had to manage support for
free trade by spending on the welfare state as a means of protecting
their citizens from the distributional impact of economic openness.13
John Ruggie has termed this tradeoff as "embedded
liberalism,"14 and even though it took different forms across the
OECD, the bargain was based on the expectation of citizens that their
governments would limit the costs and redistribute the benefits of free
trade via some kind of government intervention and spending. Support
for this hypothesis points to empirical evidence for openness to trade
being correlated with higher levels of public spending, 1 as well public
support for free trade being correlated with higher welfare spending
among OECD countries.16
However, as Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has pointed out,
the compensation required to satisfy the bargain of "embedded
liberalism" is costly. 7 A key feature of advanced globalization is that
as capital has become more mobile, it has resulted in erosion of the tax
base of countries seeking to supply social insurance. The alternative of
increasingly progressive income taxation has significant adverse
economic effects on labor, which is also unappealing politically. 18Due
13 See Jude C. Hays et al., Government Spending and Public Supportfor Trade in
the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis, 59 INT'L ORG.
473, 473-74 (2005).
14 See John G. Ruggie,International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG., 379, 392
(1982).
15 See Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,
106 J. POL. ECON. 997, 997-99 (1998).
6 See Hays et al., supra note 13, at 488-91.
7 See Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, 39 CAL. MGMT. REv. 29,
33(1997).
18 See id; Antris et al., supra note 4, at 407.
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to fiscal constraints, the welfare state in many OECD countries began
to be cut back in the 1980s, resulting in insufficient compensation to
losers from globalization and a loss of credibility in "embedded
liberalism."'9
As redistribution policies have become less feasible, and the
costs of redistribution have increased due to the severity of the China
import shock, "embedded liberalism" has the potential to be replaced
by economic nationalism.2 0 The mechanism for compensating losers
from globalization switches to protectionism. A corollary of this is that
spending on social insurance can be further reduced, which is a popular
choice with higher-income taxpayers. These policies then get wrapped
up in a political narrative of authoritarian nationalism drawing on
populist grievances.21 Before looking at what specifically drove the US
and UK to some form of economic nationalism, it is useful to think
about what might result in some portion of a country's polity being
attracted to populist themes, and why that might translate into a
concern about that country's trading arrangements.
Populism can be defined as a political movement that involves
a combination, but not necessarily all, of anti-elitism, authoritarianism
and nativism, as well as opposition to liberal economics and
22
globalization.2 A key to populism is that society is seen as being
divided into two groups: the people and the elite, the latter controlling
government, business and the financial sector, who are perceived as
not acting in the best interests of the people. This idea was clearly
captured in speeches made by Donald Trump both before and after his
election as US president, as well as in the language of those supporting
the campaign for the UK to leave the EU who sought to discredit the
views of economists on the potential costs of Brexit as "project fear."
23
Populists believe that only they represent he "true people," and as a
' See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 12, at 938; JUDE C. HAYS, GLOBALIZATION
ANDilE NIiw PoLIrICs OF EMBEDDIEO LIBERALISM, 12-13 (2009).
20 See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 12, at 938.
21 See id.
22 BARRY EICIENGREEN, THEPOPULIST TEMPTATION: ECONOMIC GRIEVANCE AND
POLITICAL REACTION INTHEMODERN ERA, 1 (2018); Rodrik, supra note 4, at 16.
23 See Heather Stewart & Anushka Asthana, David Cameron Says His EU





consequence some set of voting citizens can be convinced to reject the
"moral legitimacy" of the elite.24
Trade economists Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman argue
that populism is a specific form of "identity politics," such that voters'
preferences over trade policy reflect both their economic self-interest
as well as their concerns for the groups in society with whom they
identify. 2 5 From this they show how a dramatic rise in populism could
lead to a substantive shift in a country's trade policy towards
protectionism; these insights are specifically motivated by recent
developments in the US. Their model consists of an economy with two
types of worker, less-skilled and more-skilled, the latter accounting for
a minority of the population. The economy produces both an export-
competing and an import-competing good, the latter intensively using
less-skilled workers. More skilled workers identify with and constitute
the elite, while the less-skilled majority constitute the "working class."
Members of either skill group may also identify with a group
Grossman and Helpman describe as "the broad nation," characterized
as capturing society's aversion to inequality.26 Finally, there are two
political parties with different ideological stances, each setting a trade
policy position in order to compete for votes. The authors then posit a
"populist revolution" driven by a significant external event such as the
China import shock which widens the income distribution. As a result,
less-skilled workers no longer embrace "the broad nation," rejecting
the legitimacy of the elites, and seeing the nation as synonymous with
their type. The political-economic outcome is one where a political
party running on a populist platform implements a discrete jump in the
tariff rate imposed on the imported good.27
Before turning to the specific reasons for the US and UK
adopting radical changes in their trade policies, it is useful to
distinguish between right and left-wing populism. As noted by Rodrik,
most current populist movements are in the right-wing camp.28 These
movements focus on what Rodrik terms a "cultural cleavage" between
the people and some outside group that represent a threat to the
24 See JAN-WERNER MOLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 1-6 (2016).
25 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Identity Politics and Trade Policy
1-2 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25348, 2018).
26 See id. at 2.
2 7 See id. at 3-4.
28 See Rodrik, supra note 4, at 24.
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"popular will," 2 9 e.g., Donald Trump targeting Mexican immigrants
and China, and UK supporters of leaving the EU targeting Eastern
European immigrants and "unelected" bureaucrats in Brussels.
30 The
alternative left-wing version of populism revolves more around the
idea that a wealthy elite control the economy at the expense of lower31
income groups, e.g., Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain.
Political reality, of course, may shade this binary description, i.e., in
the aftermath of the global financial meltdown, populist politicians
chose to demonize bankers rather than focus on the technical causes of
the crisis. In other words, it is easier for populists to offer a simple
narrative that the "people" can relate to rather than discuss deeper
concepts and policy solutions.3 2
III. WHAT DROVE THE US AND UK To EcONOMic NATIONALISM?
The policy choices of the US starting a trade war, and the UK's
exit from the EU, relate to different aspects of international economic
theory even though, as we discuss below, both have common drivers.
With respect to the US's imposition of tariffs, the economist's case
against protection, which can be found in any undergraduate textbook
on international trade, is at once both straightforward and nuanced.
The standard view is that a country choosing protection will suffer a
loss in national welfare as measured by a reduction in its gross
domestic product (GDP). This follows from the fact that tariffs provide
an incentive for resources to remain in inefficient import-competing
sector(s) rather than being reallocated to more efficient export-
competing sector(s), i.e., the classic economic gains from
specialization are foregone.3 4 In addition, tariffs result in significant
distributional effects between both consumers and firms, as well as
consumers and the government, consumers paying a higher price for
goods produced domestically as well as paying tariffs on imported
goods. The net effect is that consumers end up losing more than
domestic firms and the government exchequer gain, i.e., there is
29 Id
30 EICHENGREEN, supra note 22, at 3.
3' Rodrik, supra note 4, at 24.
3 2 id
3See JAMES R. MARKUSEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND
EvIDENCE 246-49 (1995).




"deadweight" loss from protection.36 More recent economic analysis
highlights additional costs to firms-given that tariffs may be applied
to traded intermediate inputs such as automobile parts, with the
increasing importance of value-chains, tariffs increase costs to firms
who rely on these imported intermediate inputs.3 7
The exception to the standard economic case against the use of
tariffs is when a country is "large" enough to affect its international
terms of trade, i.e., the price it pays on the world market for imports
relative to the world price of its exports. In the case previously
outlined, the world price of imported goods does not change with the
imposition of tariffs as the importing country is too "small" to exercise
any market power. However, if an importing country is large enough,
the world price of its imports will fall as the tariff is imposed. In this
case, national economic welfare may increase, as the deadweight
losses borne by consumers are more than compensated for by
additional tariff revenue (subject to details relating to the elasticity.of
the export supply function). In other words, part of the cost of the tariff
is now borne by exporting countries who face a lower world pricefor
their exports, i.e., they suffer an international terms of trade loss.38
However, this case only applies if we assume that the exporting
country facing the increase in tariffs does not retaliate with tariffs of
its own. If it does, the tariff "war" that arises leads to economic losses
for both countries in what has been denoted as a term of trade,
"prisoners' dilemma."39 To the extent that the trade war between the
US and China is representative of this case, both countries, including
the US as instigator of the trade war, face economic losses. We report
on the significance of these economic losses later in Section V.
The issues relating to the UK's departure from the EU draw on
a different aspect of international trade theory: specifically, the
economics of FTAs. These agreements are aimed at increasing trade
between partner countries (trade creation), but at the expense of less
trade with non-partner countries (trade diversion); the essential point
36 See id. at 281-84.
3 See Emily J. Blanchard, Trade Wars in the GVC Era, in TRADE WAR: THE
CLASH OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ENDANGERING GLOBAL PROSPERITY 57-62
(Meredith A. Crowley ed., 2019) (ebook), https://voxeu.org/content/trade-war-
clash-economic-systems-threatening-global-prosperity.
38 See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 33, 254-58.
3 See KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF T4E WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 1-3 (2002).
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is that FTAs are discriminatory.4 0 So unlike recent developments in
US trade policy, which involve a departure from multilateral trading
rules and the potential effect on US economic welfare as noted above,
the impact of FTAs on economic welfare is much more ambiguous,
i.e., it is uncertain for any given FTA whether the gains from trade
creation outweigh the losses from trade diversion. 4 1 In other words,
there is no guarantee that economic welfare will increase and whether
it does so will depend on several factors. However, as we note below
in Section V, quantitative assessments of the UK's membership of the
EU are almost unanimous in reporting the economic benefits of the
UK's membership of the EU. This is not surprising: EU member
countries are high-income, geographically close countries, with a high
degree of integration of policies covering not just trade policies but
policies relating to competition, agriculture, regions and social policy,
and with a strong alignment of harmonized standards and regulations
all of which foster trade between EU member countries. One of the
challenges in assessing the impact of Brexit compared with the US
trade war case is that the benchmark can differ in the UK case, i.e., the
UK will be replacing one substantive trade agreement with alternative
trading arrangements involving other FTAs, a reversal to WTO most
favored nation (MFN) rules or even unilateral liberalization.
42
However, as we detail below, given the degree of integration that the
UK already has with the EU, economic welfare arising from Brexit is
likely to decline.
If the current policy choices of both the US and UK are
associated with potential reductions in their national economic
welfare, what lies behind the drive towards economic nationalism?
There are of course several candidates: a minimal social safety net in
the US and economic austerity in the UK following the global financial
crisis, immigration, the desire for national sovereignty, and
globalization or, in the phrase associated with Rodrik, reference should
be made to the notion of "hyper" globalization.
4 3 "Hyper" or advanced
40 See generally Scott L. Baier et al., Economic Determinants of Free Trade
Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence, 22 REV. INT'L
ECON. 31, 31-58 (2014); see generally Daniel C.K. Chow et al., The Revival of
Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARI)Zo L. REV. 2133,
2133-69 (2019).
41 See Chow et al., supra note 40, at 2158-59.
42 See Thomas Sampson, Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration, 31
J. ECON. PFRSPlCIVES 163, 164-67 (2017).
43 See Rodrik, supra note 4, at 27.
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globalization is where the process of global market integration goes
well beyond the removal of trade barriers to include, inter alia, rules
on intellectual property rights, domestic regulations, and standards.
Rodrik argues that in the later stages of globalization, the ratio of its
redistributive effects to net economic gains is high, due to the
efficiency effects of cutting tariffs diminishing over time as tariffs get
lower, while the negative distributional effects continue to increase.4 4
In other words, as globalization advances, trade liberalization is less
about increasing the size of the "economic pie" and more about
redistribution. The potential correlation between globalization and
increased income inequality certainly shows up in the data. For
example, over the period 1979-2007, trade as a share of US GDP
increased from 4.9 to 7.7 percent while at the same time the Gini
coefficient measuring income inequality rose from 0.48 to 0.59, trade
integration and income inequality rising virtually in parallel in the
1990s and 2000s.45
While recognizing the role of other factors, the focus in this
article is on the links between globalization, populism and the desire
for economic nationalism as experienced by the US and UK. However,
to see the links, we need to look beyond the economic aggregates
associated with the net benefits of trade and membership of FTAs as
outlined above. As we discuss, for both countries it is the consequences
of the rapid rise of China's presence on world markets that has caused
significant distributional effects. These effects were typically
concentrated in specific regions of each country that bore the brunt of
the challenges associated with the rapid rise in China and which can
be tied to voting patterns in the 2016 US presidential election and UK
referendum on the decision to leave the EU.4 6
Before examining the empirical evidence on these specific
distributional effects, it is important to place them in the appropriate
economic context. International economists have consistently shown
that trade allocates a country's relatively abundant resources to those
4See id. at 19-20.
45 See Pol Antris et al., Globalization, Inequality and Welfare, 108 J. INT'L ECON.
387, 387 (2017).
46 See generally David Autor et al., Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral
Consequences ofRising Trade Exposure (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 22637, 2017); see Italo Colantone & Piero Stanig, Global
Competition and Brexit, 112 AM.POL. Sci. REv. 201, 201 (2018).
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sectors that intensively use such resources.4 7 Trade liberalization may
cause job losses for less-skilled workers in the import-competing
sector(s), but these losses are more than offset by ob gains for more-
skilled workers in the export-competing sector(s). Shifts in resources
caused by trade maximize the value of the importing nation's GDP and
raises the purchasing power of its consumers.4 9 This is formally known
as the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem,50 familiar to all students of
international economics. Note however that a key assumption of this
model is that resources are mobile, and this mobility allows countries
to maximize the gains from trade, but which also has implications for
the income distribution effects, that may arise.
The corollary of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is that more-
skilled workers used intensively in export-competing sectors benefit
from trade, while less-skilled workers used intensively in import-
competing sectors are made worse off. In the US and UK, we might
expect trade to benefit more-skilled workers such as aeronautical
engineers employed by either Boeing or Airbus, while less-skilled
workers in their respective steel industries would be worse off. This
result, originally proposed by Stolper and Samuelson, implies that
international trade can have a significant impact on the distribution of
income.5 However, as noted above, the orthodox view is that benefits
to winners (more-skilled workers and consumers) will outweigh costs
to losers (less-skilled workers). Openness to trade therefore passes the
benefit-cost test: the winners can in principle compensate the losers
and still be better off. As noted earlier, whether or not such
compensation in fact takes place is a matter of domestic policy, and in
its absence provides an incentive for economic nationalism.
Prior to the 1990s, the flow of trade in goods was mostly
between developed countries (the "North" versus developing
47 See Ronald W. Jones & J. Peter Neary, The Positive Theory of International
Trade, 1 HANDBOOK OF INT'L ECON. 15 (Ronald W. Jones & Peter B. Kenen eds.,
1984).
48 See Jonathan Haskel et al., Globalization and US Wages: Modfying Classic
Theory to Explain Recent Facts, 26 J. ECON. PRSPECTIVES 119, 128-31 (2012).
49 See MARKUSN liTAL., supra note 33, at 63-66.
50 See Jones & Neary, supra note 47, at 21.
5' See generally Tariffs and Wages: An Inconvenient Iota of Truth, Ti ECONOMIST




countries, the "South").52 High-income countries accounted for 80
percent of world trade in 1985.5 Specifically, countries with similar
GDP/capita produced goods such as automobiles, constrained by
economies of scale and the size of their own market, and then traded
those goods with other high-income countries in a larger integrated
market for similar but differentiated goods.5 4 The view among
economists is that trade within these industries with an expanded
international market not only resulted in consumers benefiting from a
greater variety of goods, but that it also helped minimize the costs to
"losers," as it is easier to reallocate resources within industries than to
reallocate from one industry to another.5 5 This reduced the impact of
trade on the distribution of income.5 6
With growth in trade accelerating after the Second World War,
concerns were expressed in the 1980s about growing income
inequality in the US, reflected in the increasing gap between skilled
and unskilled wages.57 Critics of globalization put part of the blame on
growing imports from low-wage developing countries in the global
South.58 However, empirical analysis published in the early to mid-
1990s concluded that the effects of North-South trade on US income
inequality were very modest.59 By the start of the 2000s, the consensus
among trade economists was that trade was not a key contributing
factor in either declining employment in the US manufacturing sector
or rising income inequality.60  Economists argued that observed
changes in the US labor market were mainly due to technological
change in the manufacturing sector, which complemented more-
skilled workers, thereby driving up skilled relative to unskilled
52 See Gordon H. Hanson, The Rise ofMiddle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in
Global Trade, 26 J. ECON.PERSPECTIVES.41, 42 (2012); Daniel C.K. Chow et al.,
A Legal and Economic Critique of President Trump's China Trade Policies, 79 U
PITrT. L. REV. 207, 215 (2017).
53 See Hanson, supra note 52.
54 See id. at 48.
55See Paul R. Krugman, Intraindustry Specialization and the Gainsfrom Trade, 89
J. POL. ECON. 959, 970 (1981).
" See id. at 971.
See Paul R. Krugman, Trade and Wages, Reconsidered, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 103,104 (2008).
58See id.
59See id.
6 See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock:
Learningfrom Labor-Market Adjustment o Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV.
ECON. 205, 207 (2016).
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wages.61 For example, technological change through automation has
reduced demand for less-skilled assembly jobs in manufacturing,
while raising productivity and wages of more-skilled labor.
At the same time that economists reached a consensus that
technological change was the main factor causing loss of US
manufacturing jobs, exports from "factory China" exploded.
62 Chinese
exports gave skeptics a reason to question whether technological
change or sharply rising exports from China was the cause of negative
impacts on less-skilled labor.63 Between 2000 and 2007, US import
penetration by low-wage countries grew from 15 to 28 percent,
China's share of this growth being 89 percent." The value of US
imports from China rose by 171 percent between 2000 and 2007,
compared to growth in US exports to China of 150 percent. 
65US
manufacturing faced a significant increase in Chinese import
competition without an offsetting increase in exports-a pattern shared
by virtually all industrial sectors.66 This import shock was not unique
to the US, with China's share of UK manufacturing imports rising
from I to 8.6 percent over the period 1988-2007.67
There is now a growing body of research examining the impact
of the China import shock on US employment and other metrics.
68 For
example, Justin Pierce and David Schott have shown that US extension
of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China in 2000 was
associated with a sharp drop in US manufacturing employment
between 2000 and 2003, the effect being stronger in industries most
affected by a reduction in uncertainty about tariff rates.69 Other
researchers have found a link between the China import shock and a
61 See Eli Berman et al., Implications ofSkill-Biased Technological Change:
International Evidence, 113 Q. J. Econ. 1245, 1246-47 (1998).
62 See Autor et al., supra note 60, at 208.
6 3 See id.
64 See Autor et al., supra note 3, at 2122.
65 See id. at 2131.
6 See Autor et al., supra note 60, at 212.
67 See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 3, at 202.
68 See JUSTIN R. PIERCE & PETER K. SCHOrr, The Cost of US Trade Liberalization
with China, in TRADE WAR: THE CLASH OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ENDANGERING
GLOBAL PROSPERITY, 13-18 (Meredith A. Crowley, 2019) (ebook),
https://voxeu.org/content/trade-war-clash-economic-systems-threatening-global-
prosperity.
69 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US
Manufacturing Employment, 106 AM. ECON. REv. 1632, 1632-35 (2016).
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wider range of economic and social issues including crime rates, 70
increases in household debt,7' declines in marriage rates,72 and
increased deaths from drug overdoses.
73
In the context of this article, the most significant insights into
the domestic consequences of the China import shock are associated
with David Autor and colleagues in a series of articles.74 Their work
on the US measures the geographic exposure of labor markets across
the US to the increase in imports from China. As already noted, the
"shock" feature of Chinese imports relates to the rapid rise primarily
in manufacturing imports from China since the mid-1990s. The rising
international competitiveness of China has been associated with
increased openness in China which has allowed Western firms to
outsource production activities to China, and led to the relaxation of
central planning, accession to the WTO in 2001 and possible
manipulation of their exchange rate.'75 Not only has the rise in China's
competitiveness given rise to concerns about "unfair" trade, but the
extent and speed of the rise in imports from China has forced
considerable adjustment in importing countries with the resulting
impact on regional labor markets in importing countries where
manufacturing activities are located.
Key to identifying the impact on labor is the definition of a
labor "market." Rather than assuming that, at least in the long-run (the
time frame associated with the impact of trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model discussed above), labor is mobile within national borders, the
research of Autor et al. has focused on commuting zones, defined as
"the distance workers would reasonably commute to work, with
commuting zones being located all across the US." 76 A key feature that
70 See YI CHE & XuN Xu, The China Syndrome in US: Import Competition, Crime,
and Government Transfer, MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE PAPER 68135, 1-4,
(2015), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68135/.
n See Jean-Niel Barrot et al., Import Competition and Household Debt, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORTS No. 821, 1-4, (2018).
72 See David H. Autor et al., When Work Disappears: Manufacturing Decline and
the Falling Marriage- Value ofMen 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working
Paper No. 23173, 2018).
73 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, Trade Liberalization and Mortality:
Evidencefrom U.S. Counties 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22849, 2016), https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.094.
74 See Autor et al., supra note 60; see also Autor et al., supra note 3.
See Autor et al., supra note 60, at 211-15.
See Autor et al., supra note 3, at 2122-23, 2132.
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arises from using commuting zones as a unit of measurement is that
labor does not have a strong tendency to change commuting zones. In
other words, labor is not as mobile as trade theory assumes.
Autor et al. then overlay the industrial structure of US
commuting zones in order to gauge the impact of exposure these
industries have to competition from Chinese imports. Since this
matches the characterization of commuting zones, they are then able
to assess the impact of the recent rise of China on local labor markets."
Since labor does not have a strong tendency to move, the impact of
Chinese imports is particularly strong across certain US states; wages
fall dramatically, women withdraw from the workforce, there is an
increase in demand for social benefits and disability allowances and
when workers are re-engaged in the same commuting zone, re-hiring
is at wages much lower than previous employment. 
7 8 This is the main
feature of the China import shock. The impact is dramatically different
depending on geography; typically southern and eastern states suffer
while other states escape the impact of the rise of China given the
differences in industrial structure. In sum, looking beyond the
aggregate of "national" welfare, the impact of the rapid recent rise in
globalization, and especially the growth of China, has had a significant
effect on certain parts of the US.
However, the effect of globalization on the political
environment in the US, manifested in economic nationalism, requires
one more part to the story: how did these effects impact the
polarization of US voting patterns? Autor et al. address this issue by
extending their analysis of the China import shock to an examination
of voting patterns across the US.7 9 Using detailed data on voting in
congressional and presidential elections, they report two main results.
First, while accounting for other determinants of voting patterns, e.g.,
education, age, white collar status etc., due to the dramatic rise in
imports from China, voters were less likely to support moderate
candidates of either main political party. There was a swing to either
end of the political spectrum reflecting an increase in polarization in
the US political environment. Second, in presidential elections, in the
districts most exposed to competition from Chinese imports, the China
import shock was reflected in an increase in support for Republican
7 7 See id. at 2123.
78See id. at 2159.
Autor et al., supra note 46.
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candidates.8 0 Although other factors may have contributed to the
divisiveness of US politics in recent years, these authors have
established a clear link between the impact of globalization and
political outcomes that ties closely with the "America First" slogan and
the targeting of tariffs by President Trump. As Autor et al. point out,
both presidential candidates explicitly highlighted competition from
China in their electoral campaigns, the results here suggesting that the
competition from China favored the Republican candidate. In a follow-
up paper, Autor et al. report results from a counterfactual analysis: if
competition from China had not been as strong as it was in certain
states that were less vulnerable to Chinese imports, the Democratic
candidate might have won the Electoral College vote.81
Other research by Colantone and Stanig explores the issue of
the China import shock, but in this case the focus is on the UK and the
potential link with the Brexit referendum.8 2 As with the US, the UK
experienced a sharp rise in imports from China; total imports from low
income countries as a whole increased but the share of imports from
non-China low income sources remained low, i.e., the increase in
globalization was almost wholly due to the rise in imports from
83China. In exploring the links between the rise in globalization and
the 2016 referendum on Brexit, their analysis consisted of two main
parts. First, they explored voting patterns in the referendum. Second,
they investigated which regions in the UK were most exposed to the
China import shock.8 4 The key question was, therefore, to what extent
was the sharp increase in globalization and the impact it had on regions
most exposed to globalization, or, more specifically, trade with low
income countries, a contributory factor in the Brexit referendum while
accounting for other factors?
In terms of the first issue, voting for Brexit was not evenly
spread across the UK. In broad terms, "Vote Leave" was concentrated
in the midlands, the northeastern parts of England and the southeast.
"Vote Leave" had less support in London and the surrounding area,
80 See id.
81 See David Autor et al., A Note on the Effect of Rising Trade Exposure on the
2016 Presidential Election I (Mar. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (https://
economics.mit.edu/files/12418).
82 See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 3.
8 See id at 202.
8 See id. at 201.
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Wales, and Scotland.8 With reference to the second issue, exposure to
globalization was strongest in the midlands and the north of England.
Although there was not a perfect overlap between the industrial
structure and exposure to globalization and "Vote Leave," there was a
sufficiently strong correlation to suggest that there is a potential
relationship between the two.86
Using an econometric model relating voting patterns in the
referendum with the regional impact of the China import shock, and
controlling for other factors that capture the economic differences
across regions in the UK, they confirm a strong link between
globalization and the Brexit vote. 87 They substantiate this with more
micro-level evidence relating to individual voting patterns, i.e.,
accounting for level of education, age, worker status etc., and not just
voting patterns at the regional level. The link between globalization
and the vote to leave the EU holds up: the statistically strong
relationship between Brexit and globalization is robust to controlling
for a wide range of other factors at the regional or individual level that
may also have influenced the desire to leave the EU.
Colantone and Stanig also explore the possible influence
between Brexit and another dimension of globalization, i.e.,
immigration. The inflow of immigrants mainly from the relatively new
members of the EU was featured prominently in the run-up to the
referendum. However, they fail to find a clear, strong relationship
between Brexit and immigration despite the media focus on this
alleged connection. To the extent they do find a relationship, it
emerges only with respect to "new arrivals" from Eastern Europe
rather than the total level of immigration or immigrant share of
regional population.89 This is consistent with other studies on the labor
market effects of immigration: to the extent that there is a relationship,
it does not relate to total numbers of immigrants present in the UK or
overall flows of immigrants; the links between immigration, labor
market outcomes and Brexit is more nuanced than what either the
British media or pro-Brexit campaigners have suggested.
85See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 3, at 208.
86See id. at 209.
8 7 See id at 209-13.
8 8 See id. at 213-15.
89 see id. at 215-16.
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How does the rise in globalization associated with the China
import shock translate into the rise in economic nationalism in the UK
and Europe more broadly? Colantone and Stanig also address this issue
by investigating the links in the rise in the "radical" right wing parties
across European countries and tie this with the exposure to the China
import shock and voting patterns.90 They set out the argument that the
rise in globalization could be reflected in opposite swings in the
political spectrum. Since globalization results in distributional effects,
exposure to increased trade and the difficulties or high costs associated
with dealing with the consequences could be reflected in increased
electoral support for left-wing parties that may be associated with
protectionism combined with increased government expenditure on
social safety nets. Alternatively, electoral support for more radical
right-wing parties may increase with increased nationalism,
protectionism and an economically liberal, i.e., low-tax, domestic
political agenda.91 As noted earlier, these are key features associated
with economic nationalism.
To address this, Colantone and Stanig extend the dataused to
address the impact of the China import shock in the UK, to fifteen
European countries. On the political side, they create an index of the
political stances of parties competing in national elections across the
fifteen countries where, at a more aggregate level, the political index
relates to "nationalism," "nationalist autarky" and "radical right."9 2 At
a more disaggregate level, they produce an index ranging from the
"protectionist left" and "protectionist right" through to a measure of
economic nationalism reflecting political stances on free trade and
isolationism, laissez-faire on domestic economic issues and a strong
nationalist stance.93
The headline results show a strong relationship between the
China import shock and nationalism and nationalist autarky and,
overall, a rising share of electoral support for radical right parties.94
The more disaggregated results are the most informative: There are no
statistically significant results relating the China import shock and
electoral support for the protectionist left. The strongest statistical
results relate to the rise of right-wing economic nationalism.95 These
9 See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 12, at 937.
91See id. at 938-39.
*See id at 941-42.
9See id. at 942-43.
94 See id. at 944-49.
9See id. at 949-51.
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results are robust to controls reflecting trade from other sources, such
as intra-EU trade, and characteristics of the industry composition of
the regions where the impact of globalization was most strongly
exposed.
In sum, these results show a strong link between globalization
and the recent rise in economic nationalism. By allowing for the
possibility of voting for more protectionist trade policy but with the
possibility of stronger domestic intervention to deal with distributional
impacts, Colantone and Stanig provide important insights into the
implications of globalization in recent years.
9 6 It should also be noted
that these results differ from those produced by Autor et al. relating to
the US.9 7 Specifically, the latter show that there is a strong link
between the rapid rise in globalization and political polarization, but
the polarization involves a shift in voters' preferences to either end of
the political spectrum;98 Colantone and Stanig show that the
experience of the fifteen European countries goes more clearly in one
direction.9 9
Before considering how economic nationalism as a policy
framework has been expressed in the US and UK, one further question
remains to be addressed. Specifically, given that many other factors
can have an impact on income distribution, the demise of
manufacturing, economic disparities across regions, and economic
austerity more generally, why is the emphasis on the impact of
globalization and economic nationalism and not, say, on the rise of
technology replacing workers in the manufacturing sector and the
impact of the global financial crisis? Di Tella and Rodrik have recently
explored this issue.'" They conduct a large online survey in the US
and consider a range of factors that may impact on labor demand
across regions. These include (i) a demand shock, (ii) a labor-saving
technology shock, (iii) "bad" management, (iv) outsourcing activities
to another country, (v) imports from rich countries, and (vi) imports
from low income countries. Different sources of shocks elicited desire
for government action; for example, in response to a demand or
96 See id.
9 See Autor et al., supra note 46, at 42.
9 See id. at 43.
9 See Colantone & Stanig, supra note 12, at 951.
'00 See generally Rafael Di Tella & Dani Rodrik, Labor Market Shocks and the
Demandfor Trade Protection: Evidencefrom Online Surveys 1-37 (Nat'I Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25705, 2019).
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technology shock, there was a desire for government action either in
the form of "transfers" or restricting imports. 0 1 But in relation to the
source of the shock relating to imports from low income countries,
there was an overwhelming response in favor of government
restricting imports and opposition too overnment transfers that would
cushion the effects of globalization.!
In sum, even though there can be several factors that may cause
difficulties for labor market adjustment, there is a strong "preference"
for government action, and government action of a specific form, when
labor market adjustment relates to globalization, particularly imports
from countries that export goods which may compete directly with
(declining) manufacturing sectors. These insights support the
econometric results from Autor et al. reported above: When they
account for other shocks that may have affected the demand for labor
in the US, the strongest impact in terms of the resulting polarization in
US politics related to the rise in imports from China.1 0 3 They
rationalize this on the basis that the China import shock is likely to
have been more concentrated which, in turn, was reflected in swings
to the less moderate sections of the political spectrum and contributed
more than these other factors to the net gains by the Republican
presidential candidate.10 4
IV. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM: THE RESPONSE IN THE US AND THE
POLITICAL VACUUM IN THE UK
A. US Trade War
Since President Trump came into office, his administration has
chosen to follow a radical departure from US trade policy as
implemented in the post-war period. While the administration has
targeted many countries, it is the progressive escalation of average
tariffs against China that stand out and have been a consistent part of
the President's political strategy to present a narrative that China has
hurt the US through not "playing by the rules." Prior to China joining
the WTO in 2001, the US implemented an average tariff against China
10See id. at 2-3.
102 See id. at 2.
103 See Autor et al., supra note 46, at 3.
104See Autor et al., supra note 46, at 4.
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of 38.6 percent, which fell to 3.1 percent after China's accession.'
0 5 In
the first phase of the trade war, during 2018, average US tariffs against
China increased to 12.4 percent, covering $250 billion worth of
Chinese imports.10 6 On May 10, 2019, when ongoing trade talks
between the US and China broke down, average US tariffs were
increased to 18.3 percent.107 More recently on August 1, 2019, the
President announced that new tariffs would be implemented against an
additional $300 billion of imports from China, raising the average
tariff rate to 21.5 percent, with the threat that these tariffs will increase
to an average of 27.8 percent, covering 97 percent of US imports from
China.08
Apart from its appeal to economic nationalism, is there any
economic logic to what President Trump is doing in terms of initiating
and escalating a trade war with China? In order to answer this question,
it is important to understand the basic logic of the GATT/WTO.
0 As
noted previously, formation of the GATT in 1947 was recognition by
the international community of the damage visited on the global
economy by countries unilaterally raising tariffs during the inter-war
period, i.e., the outcome of the terms of trade "prisoner's dilemma"
noted in the previous section. The GATT/WTO can essentially be
thought of as a cooperative game where countries commit to reducing
their tariffs following the principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination. Specifically, during rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations the focus is on balancing tariff concessions by individual
countries, and the agreed lower tariffs are then applied on a non-
discriminatory, MFN basis."0 If any country unilaterally raises its
tariff(s), thereby reducing market access of a trading partner(s), the
latter can retaliate by withdrawing an equivalent amount of market
05 See Chad P. Bown & Eva Zhang, Trump's Latest Trade War Escalation Will
Push Average Tariffs on China Above 20 Percent, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L
ECON.: PHE CHARTS (August 6, 2019), https://www.piie.com/research/piie-
charts/trumps-latest-trade-war-escalation-will-push-average-tariffs-china-above-
2 0 .
106,See Chad P. Bown & Eva Zhang, Trump's 2019 Protection Could Push China
Back to Smoot-Hawley Tariff Levels, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.: TRADE &





108 See Bown & Zhang, supra note 105.
109 See Chow, Sheldon & McGuire, supra note 40, at 2141-46.
110See Daniel C.K. Chow & Ian Sheldon, Is Strict Reciprocity Requiredfor Fair
Trade?, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 33-38 (2019).
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access. IIIn other words, the rules of the GATT/WTO seek to maintain
the balance of concessions and avoid the use of highly punitive actions
by countries.112
Analysis of President Trump's trade policy choices has
typically interpreted them in terms of a zero-sum game, i.e., rather than
generating mutual benefits in a positive-sum game, international trade
is a game where economically, one country is a winner while the other
must be a loser.1 13 However, there is an alternative explanation for
these actions: the administration has chosen to move from "rules-
based" to "power-based" bargaining over tariffs as a means of dealing
with what are termed "latecomers" to the GATT/WTO.1 14 In 2017, the
US's average MFN tariff was 3.4 percent, which compared to China's
average MFN tariff of 9.6 percent."' Given this asymmetry, the US
has little left to offer in terms of reciprocity, and instead it has resorted
to unilaterally raising its tariffs against China in order to induce them
to cut their tariffs.
The jury is currently out on this strategy: instead of cutting its
tariffs in response to the US raising tariffs, China has retaliated in kind
by raising its tariffs against the US, their average tariff reaching 18.1
percent by 2018,116 and there is little prospect that the two countries
will reach an agreement to halt the trade war anytime soon. " In
addition, there are many complex issues associated with China's
behavior as a trading nation that go well beyond their average tariff
levels, including, inter alia, forced technology transfer, theft of
intellectual property, investment restrictions, and subsidies to state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).1 18 A commonly held view is that rather than
targeting China unilaterally with tariffs, the US should have sought a
"1 See Chow, Sheldon & McGuire, supra note 40, at 2144-46.
112 See generally Robert R. Staiger, International Rules andInstitutionsfor Trade
Policy, in HANDBOOK OF INT'L ECON. 1495 (Gene M. Grossman & Kenneth
Rogoff, 1995).
113 See Chow & Sheldon, supra note 110, at 10.
114 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 6, at 1.
115See Chad P.Bown, The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict After 40 Years ofSpecial
Protection 30 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 19-7, 2019).
116 See id.
11 7 See Charles Hankla, Will Trump's trade war with China ever end?,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 5, 2019), https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-trade-war-
with-china-ever-end-121405.
11 See generally WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536,
CHINA-US TRADE ISSUES (2018).
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coalition with other developed countries such as the EU and Japan, in
order to bring a comprehensive case against China at the WTO.11
9
B. What Form Will Brexit Take?
In contrast to the explicit actions exercised by the Trump
administration with the imposition of tariffs, political parties in the UK
have vacillated over what form Brexit should take. o This has been
complicated by the split in political opinion on the case for Brexit or
the form it would take crossing intra-party lines.121 In large part, this
reflects the referendum on the decision to leave the EU: the question
asked was binary (remain or leave) but there was no consideration of
what "leave" would mean.122 Although the UK government has since
given formal notice of its wish to cease being a member of the EU, the
widespread debate in the UK and the subsequent political impasse
(including the resignation of Prime Minister Theresa May) has
revolved around what actual form Brexit will take.1
23 The choice of
what form relations with the EU will take following Brexit will
determine not only the trading relations with the EU but also the
capacity of the UK to form FTAs with other countries; retaining
membership of the EU customs union which would facilitate trade
between the UK and its former EU partners would constrain the nature
of trade deals it may want to agree with other countries. In broad terms,
the Brexit debate since the referendum has focused on a "hard" vs. a
"soft" Brexit and, tied closely with this, how "national sovereignty" is
exercised by the UK in its future trading arrangements.2
4
"9See Robert Z. Lawrence, How the United States Should Confront China Without
Threatening the Global Trading System 1-8 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working
Paper No. 18-17, 2018).
120 See Theodore Dalrymple, Dangerous Times in the UK: Thoughts on the Brexit
Mess, CITY JOURNAL-EYE ON TIE NEWS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.city-
journal.org/brexit.
121 See Rafael Behr, Deal or No Deal, Both Labour and Tories willSplit over
Brexit, GUARDIAN (Feb. I2, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/feb/I2/deal-no-deal-labour-tories-brexit-may-corbyn.
122 See David Allen Green, The Tale of the Brexit Referendum Question, FIN.TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/b56b2b36-1835-37c6-8152-
bI75cf077ae8.
123 See Benjamin Mueller & Stephen Castle, Theresa May's Resignation Throws a
Fractured Britain Into Further Turmoil, N.Y.TiMis (May 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/05/24/world/europe/uk-brexit- theresa-may.htmi.





The "hard" and "soft" Brexit options relate not only to the
potential implications for trade costs and the re-orientation ofUK trade
but also to political issues (particularly in regard to the free movement
of labor) that may be more or less palatable to the UK government and
public as the post-Brexit trade deal will encompass trade-offs if access
to the EU Single Market is to be retained. It is important to bear in
mind that, although trade issues are central to post-Brexit options and
the ability to negotiate new trade deals, Brexit is also tied up with other
issues that will determine what the divorce from the EU will entail.
"Hard" Brexit is what the most zealous "Brexiteers" would
demand and is alternatively referred to as the "WTO option."l 25 A
more extreme version of this would involve unilateral trade
liberalization since the WTO option would only constrain the
maximum level of tariffs that could be applied; there would be no
constraint on the UK choosing to reduce tariffs to zero as long as the
WTO principle of non-discrimination was applied. In the WTO case,
the UK would be, in a policy sense, completely extricated from the EU
and would apply MN tariffs vis-&-vis all its trading partners. The UK
would seek trade deals with any other country independently of the
EU. At the same time, the UK would lose access to the EU Single
Market. There would be no requirement to retain the principle of free
movement of labor, though the UK financial sector would have no
right of access in other EU Member States. However, given that the
EU is the UK's major trading partner, this would have a significant
impact on trade. The UK's exports to and imports from the EU would
now be subject to tariffs and non-tariff barriers, as detailed above.
Even if the UK retained the same (EU) regulatory and other aspects of
harmonization that apply at present, the costs of trade could still rise
due to, inter alia, customs checks, border controls and auditing of
regulations to ensure compliance.
"Soft" Brexit comes in a variety of forms, but which are largely
centered on retaining some degree of access to the EU Single
Market.12 6 These "soft" Brexit options reflect relationships that other
non-member countries have established with the EU. One version of
this is the "Norway option" involving membership of the European
Economic Area (EEA):1 2 7 Norway is not a member of the EU, can
125 See id
126 See id
127 See Sampson, supra note 2, at 164-165.
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negotiate its own trading arrangements with non-EU countries but has
access to the EU Single Market. However, compromises would be
necessary to comply with this option: as part of the Single Market,
there would still have to be free movement of labor and contributions
to the EU budget would still be made. In addition, the UK would have
no input into rulemaking at the EU level but still be subject to EU
decisions. But the costs of UK's trade with the EU would still rise even
with tariff-free access and harmonization with EU standards.
Specifically, the "Norway option" would require rules of origin for
exports to the EU given that Norway still has the capacity to form its
own trade arrangements with non-EU countries.
An alternative "soft" option is a bilateral deal, very similar to
the agreement Switzerland has with the EU.1 29 This again involves free
access to the EU market but with the quid pro quo of free movement
of labor. While the UK would have the freedom to negotiate bilateral
deals with non-EU countries and to opt in or out of EU programs on a
case-by-case basis, the downsides of this option (at least as it applies
to Switzerland) is that trade in services is excluded which would have
implications for the UK financial sector and that there are still financial
contributions to the EU budget.
Bespoke FTAs, such as the Canadian FTA with the EU, offer
alternative forms of post-Brexit arrangements with the EU, but there
may be limitations on what would be covered here.130 For example, in
the Canadian-EU FTA, although market access for Canadian exports
to the EU will increase, there are certain exclusions particularly in the
agricultural and food sectors and services.131 Finally, there is the
option to become a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)
which would involve free trade in goods with the EU, excluding
services, but avoids commitments regarding free movement of labor
128 Various studies have highlighted the impact of rules of origin as representing an
increase in trade costs. See, e.g., Paola Conconi et al., The Perverse Effect of Rules
ofOrigin, Vox CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://voxeu.org/article/perverse-effect-preferential-rules-origins.
129 See Sampson, supra note 2, at 166.
130 See id.
111 The EU-Canadian trade deal-the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) - came into force in September 2017. Tariffs across almost all
tariff lines are fully eliminated. There are some exceptions that apply in the food
and agricultural sectors, however. Some sectors have been identified as being
sensitive where either the opening of the partner countries markets has been limited
or where it has been excluded from the trade agreement (for example, poultry).
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and contributions to the EU budget. The UK would be subject to
product standards set by the EU and, by not being a member of the
customs union, it would incur border checks to ensure compliance with
EU requirements.
The options between "soft" and "hard" Brexit, therefore, have
revolved around trade costs that will apply to the UK following exit
from the EU and will relate to the extent to which the UK and EU will
compromise on wider issues. At one end, the range of "soft" Brexit
options involve access to the EU Single Market; in this case, there
would still be an increase in trade costs beyond what applies to UK-
EU trade at present though with the added complications of retaining
the principle of free movement of labor in particular and continued
financial contributions to the EU budget, both of which could have
significant political ramifications in the UK.132 At the other end,
"hard" Brexit gives the UK more sovereignty and avoids the political
compromises associated with the softer options. But "hard" Brexit
would involve the most significant increase in trade costs and a greater
re-orientation of trade away from the EU.133
C. Discussion
Although the China import shock has been identified as a
common theme in both the election of President Trump, and, also the
UK referendum vote to leave the EU, the policy responses have clearly
been quite different. In the case of the US, while the President did
withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a "mega"-
FTA, and his administration also renegotiated the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the focus has been almost
exclusively on targeting China with tariffs, progressively escalating to
a full-blown trade war between the two countries. In contrast, the UK,
while seeking to redefine its trading relationship with the EU, is also
actively seeking to negotiate either new FTAs or FTAs to replace those
that were negotiated on its behalf by the EU.
In other words, the US has followed a key tenet of economic
nationalism: opposition to free trade and increased isolationism, which
imposes costs on both the US and Chinese economies, -as well as
running the risk of undermining the multilateral trading system. By
contrast, economic nationalism in the UK is not being expressed
32 See Sampson, supra note 2, at 165-66.
33See id.
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through a desire to become more isolationist, but instead the UK
government wishes to exert sovereignty over its own current and future
trading relationships. While this may have a negative economic impact
on the EU, it does not reflect an obvious threat to the global trading
system as, even with a "no-deal" Brexit, the UK has signaled that it
will abide by the rules of the WTO.
V. THE COSTS OF EcONOMic NATIONALISM
A. US Trade Policy
Not surprisingly, given the height and breadth of the tariffs
applied by the US against China in 2018, some widely reported studies
of the short-run economic impacts have already been published,
notably Fajgelbaum et al., and Amiti, Redding and Weinstein.1
34
Without discussing the technical details, the former study quantifies
the impact of the trade war on the US for 2018 as follows: first, US
consumers and firms that import goods lost in aggregate $68.8 billion
due to higher, tariff-inclusive prices; second, due to changes in the
US's international terms of trade, US exporting firms saw increased
benefits of $23.0 billion; and, third, US tariff revenue increased by
$39.4 billion. The net impact, which can be thought of as the
"deadweight loss" of the trade war in 2018 sums to -$6.4 billion. In
other words, the short-run net effects were quite small at 0.03 percent
of US GDP, but the re-distributional effects were substantial.1
35 The
latter study reports a similar estimate of the "deadweight loss" to the
US economy in 2018 of -$6.9 billion.1 3 6
Interestingly, Fajgelbaum et al.'s empirical analysis also shows
that if other countries, including China, had not retaliated against US
imposition of tariffs, US losses would have been smaller at -$2.0
billion due to larger terms of trade effects-precisely what the theory
predicts. 37 Importantly, this result also emphasizes the economic risks
134 See Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et al., The Return to Protectionism, (Nat'I Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25638, 2019); see also Mary Amiti, Stephen J.
Redding, & David Weinstein, The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices
and Welfare, (Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Res., Discussion Paper No. 13564, 2019).
1 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 134, at 3.
136 See Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, & David Weinstein, The Impact ofthe
2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare, 22 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Res.,
Discussion Paper No. 13564, 2019).
" See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 134, at 27.
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associated with the US having started a trade war, i.e., an additional
loss of $4.4 billion. In addition, once the regional effects of foreign
tariff retaliation are explicitly accounted for, the empirical evidence
suggests that workers in strong Republican counties have borne the
brunt of the trade war so far. This follows from the fact that US tariffs
raised the cost of imported imports in these counties, and because
retaliation has disproportionately been targeted at the US agricultural
sector, notably the 25 percent Chinese tariff on US soybean imports.3 8
There is also evidence that foreign tariffs were explicitly targeted at
districts that supported Trump in 2016, and that such targeting has
been moderately successful, with Republican candidates faring worse
in the 2018 Midterm elections.139
Beyond the immediate economic effect of US trade policy,
there is the broader issue of how it might impact the multilateral
trading system. As noted in Section IV, the issue of China's trading
practices is well-documented, but rather than seeking recourse through
the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, the US has deliberately
chosen to proceed via "power-based" bargaining. Specifically, it
appealed to the WTO's national security exception in imposing tariffs
on imports of steel and aluminum, and it unilaterally implemented
tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese imports under Section 301 of the US
Trade Act of 1974 after only an internal investigation by the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR).1 4 0
The concern here is that by switching from "rules-based" to
"power-based" bargaining, the US is putting the future of the post-war
trading system at risk. As noted previously, the MFN principle and
reciprocity have been key to the functioning of the GATT/WTO, both
acting as a constraint on exercise of bargaining power by a powerful
country such as the US. 14 1 Specifically, MFN dilutes bargaining
power by ensuring that tariff commitments to either one country or a
sub-set of countries in the GATT/WTO are then offered to all other
138See id. at 3.
139See Thiemo Fetzer & Carlo Schwarz, Tarffs and Politics: Evidenceform
Trump's Trade Wars 5 (Ctr. for Econ.Res., Working Paper No. 13579, 2019).
See Chad P. Brown, The 2018 Trade War and the End ofDispute Settlement as
We Knew It, in TRADE WAR: THE CLASH OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ENDANGERING
GLOBAL PROSPERITY 21, 22 (Meredith A. Crowley, 2019) (ebook),
https://voxeu.org/content/trade-war-clash-economic-systems-threatening-global-
prosperity.
141 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 6, at 2.
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countries in the GATT/WTO, and at the same time reciprocity
establishes the idea that there will be a balance of tariff concessions in
any negotiating round of GATT/WTO. By committing to such a set of
rules, the US has helped induce other weaker/smaller countries to
successively lower their tariffs under GATT/WTO.1
42 With the US
apparently abandoning these rules, it is following a "myopic logic,"
i.e., by using bargaining tariffs, the US ignores the possibility that
other countries will resort to the same strategy, thereby undermining
the multilateral trading system and depriving China in the future of a
commitment mechanism when it eventually becomes the global
economic superpower.14 3 In the long run, the absence of an effective
"rules-based" system could prove very costly to the US and its trading
partners.144
B. The UK's Brexit Policy
In the run-up to and following the outcome of the referendum
on the UK's membership of the EU, many studies were produced to
evaluate the potential impact on the UK. These studies originated from
private organizations, the government and academia; what is notable
is the almost unanimous consensus that leaving the EU would reduce
economic welfare and potentially substantially, contingent on the form
that Brexit could take. To trade economists, the direction of the impact
is not surprising. There had been several econometric studies on how
trade between EU member countries had increased: Carrere, using data
on 130 countries over the period 1962 to 1996, estimated that
membership of the EU increased trade by 104 percent;1
4 5 Baier and
Bergstrand estimated that EU membership increased intra-EU trade by
over 92 percent'46 and Eicher et al. estimated the trade enhancing
effect to be in the region of 50 percent.'
47 Given the trade linkages
between the UK and the rest of the EU, it is not surprising that trade is
142 See id. at 8.
143 See id. at 11-13.
144 See id. at 6.
145 See C6line Carrbre, Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trade Agreements on
Trade Flows with Proper Specification ofthe Gravity Model, 50 EUR. ECON. REV.
223, 234 (2006).
146 See Scott L. Baier & Jeffery H. Bergstrand, Do Free Trade Agreements Actually
Increase Members'International Trade?, 71 J. INT'L ECON.72, 83 (2007).
147 See Theo S. Eicher et al., Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Revisited:
Accounting for Model Uncertainty and Natural Trading Partner Effects, 27 J.
APPLIi) ECONOMETRICs. 310, 296-321 (2012).
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expected to decline as a consequence of Brexit. But the extent of this
decline will depend on what trading relationships the UK establishes
with the EU in the future and, related to this, the nature of the UK's
trade with the rest of the world whether this be via WTO rules or
establishing new FTAs with other countries.
The most significant studies of the economic impact of Brexit
were produced by the UK Treasury and Dinghra et al.14 8 Although
common to both is the economic evaluation of some degree of UK
sovereignty over trade policy, they differ from the recent studies of the
impact of the US-China trade war summarized above. First,'given the
potential "structural" changes to the UK economy as the UK re-
orientates its trading relations with the EU and the rest of the world,
the economic evaluation differentiates between the static and dynamic
effects.14 9 The static effects relate essentially to the impact on trade,
and foreign direct investment, that would arise from Brexit. The
dynamic effects relate to the impact on productivity since, over the
long-run, trade encourages competition and innovation and has
potentially more substantive effect on UK national welfare.15 0
Sampson reports that the dynamic effects of openness can exceed the
static trade effects by a factor of between 2 to 3.1
The second main difference relates to defining what the
alternative to membership of the EU will be, i.e., a "soft" or "hard"
Brexit. Even the softest form of Brexit could potentially entail losses:
although a "soft" Brexit would retain close trade linkages between the
UK and EU, trade costs would still increase. But there would be a more
substantive rise in trade costs with a "hard" Brexit due to the
imposition of WTO MFN tariffs on imports from the EU, and the
increase in non-tariff measures that would also impact trade. Of
course, WTO MFN tariffs do not restrict countries from applying
lower tariffs that would apply to both EU countries and the rest of the
148 See HM TREASURY, THE LONG TERM ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EU MEMBERSHIP
AND THE ALTERNATIVES (2016); Swati Dhingra et al., The Costs and Benefits of
Leaving the EU: Trade Effects, 92 ECON. POLICY 652 (2017).
149See id. at 653-56.
oSee id. at 678-82.
151 See Thomas Sampson, et al., The Economistsfor Brexit Predictions Are
Inconsistent with the Basic Facts ofInternational Trade, LONDON SCH. ECON. &
POL. SCI.: BREXIT? (Aug. 23, 2017), https://blogs.ise.ac.uk/
brexit/2017 /0 8/2 3/economists-for-brexit-predictions-are-inconsistent-with-basic-
facts-of-intemational-trade/.
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world. This scenario of unilateral liberalization was advocated by a
pro-Brexit group known as the "Economists for Free Trade" and was
the isolated exception insofar as it estimated the impact of Brexit (in
this form) to be positive, although these gains were disputed in the
assessment by Sampson et al.52
Arguably the most widely publicized assessment of the impact
of Brexit was the UK Treasury report published in the run-up to the
Referendum.15 3 Although produced by a UK government department,
it received a negative reaction from leading members of the UK
Conservative Party which, given its evaluation of significant negative
impacts arising from Brexit was labelled as "project fear".1
54 In more
detail, the estimates from the UK Treasury indicated a substantial
negative impact of Brexit. The most immediate and obvious impact
relates to the change in trade flows and the volume of trade as barrier-
free trade no longer applies to UK exports and imports even under the
"soft" Brexit option. The Treasury estimates that the UK's departure
from the EU but retained access to the Single Market would reduce
trade by around 9 percent. The WTO option, however, would reduce
UK trade by between -17 and -24 percent. A negotiated FTA deal
would reduce trade by between -14 and -19 percent.5 5
The impact on trade is the source of the significant welfare
losses that arise from Brexit. With a "hard" Brexit, welfare is predicted
to fall by 7.5 percent.'5 6 The Treasury aimed to convey the significance
of these effects by relating the impact to the cost at the household level;
in 2015 terms, each household would be £5,200 worse off as a result
of a "hard" Brexit. A "soft" Brexit would still involve substantial
losses of between 3.8 to 6.2 percent of GDP (equivalent to between -
£2,600 and -£4,300 at the household level), the range dependent on the
specific form a "soft" Brexit would take.'
5 7 To put these numbers in
context, the data from the UK Office for National Statistics reports
average household disposable income in 2015 at around £28,000. As
152 See id. at 164.
1See HM TREASURY, supra note 148, at 128.
154 See Joshua Mackenzie-Lawrie, The Treasury is the real threat to Brexit, THE
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the estimates from the Treasury analysis show, even the 'softest'
version of all, i.e., continued access to the EU Single Market, would
still involve losses to the UK as the level of trade with EU Member
States would fall; this is due to the impact of some non-tariff barriers,
such as customs procedures and rules of origin issues, even if there
was tariff-free access and harmonization of standards between the UK
and the rest of the EU. 5 8
More detailed assessment of the (static) trade effects are
reported by Dhingra et al., using an alternative approach, to measuring
the impact of Brexit.1 5 9 As with the UK Treasury assessment, the trade
effects of a "soft" Brexit are lower than the "hard" Brexit case. There
is a decrease in total trade of between -8 percent (for imports) and -9
percent (for exports), though trade with the EU falls by a considerably
greater amount (-25 percent for exports and -22 percent for imports).
In the "hard" Brexit case, trade falls by around -16 to -17 percent with
the reduction in trade with the EU being much more significant.iso
These trade effects translate into substantive changes in welfare. In the
"soft" Brexit case, welfare falls by -1.34 percent which translates (at
2015 levels) into a decrease in household income of -£893. These
losses are almost doubled in the "hard" Brexit case, with a decrease in
welfare of -2.66 percent, corresponding to a decrease in household
level income of-£ 1773.161 The most significant impact relates to being
outside the EU as further integration develops with further
harmonization across EU member countries and the removal of
remaining non-tariff barriers. The "price" of missing out translates into
a decline in welfare of -0.9 percent in the "soft" Brexit case to -1.6
percent in the "hard" Brexit case.162
The UK Treasury provided an updated assessment of the
potential impact of Brexit in 2018.163 This updated assessment was
motivated by two factors. One was a revised methodology to evaluate
the impact of Brexit. Second, since the political debate had developed
on what form a "soft" Brexit may take due to publication of the
"8See id at 85.
159 Swati Dhingra et al., The Costs and Benefits ofLeaving the EU: Trade Effects,
92 ECON. POLIcY 652, 674 (2017).
160 See id.
161See id at 671-74.
162 See id. at 671.
6 See HM TREASURY, EU EXIT: LONG TERM ECONOMIC ANALYsIs (2018).
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Government's White Paper,'64 this together with the revised
methodology would provide a revised assessment of the potential
impact. That said, the revised assessment did not alter the substance of
the impact of Brexit. The "softest" form of Brexit would reduce UK
welfare by 0.7 percent; a "hard" Brexit, or in the revised terminology
since negotiations were already underway, a "no deal" outcome,
welfare would decline by 7.6 percent.16 5
In sum, none of the main studies report a positive outcome for
the UK following Brexit, whatever form it takes. Indeed, all report
substantive negative consequences with damaging effects on the UK
economy which translates into significant reductions in the income of
average households. The effects come not only through static effects
associated with reductions in (net) trade but also through dynamic
effects associated with increases in productivity and innovation
associated with openness. As discussed above, economic nationalism
as expressed in the outcome of the referendum to leave the EU, Brexit
is not per se associated with concerns about globalization (at least as
far as trade is concerned) as the expectation is that the UK government
will seek trade deals with other countries. But Brexit is certainly
denying gravity: the UK will reduce its ties with its major trade partner
and forego lower trade costs associated with the process of European
integration. These effects may be ameliorated to some extent by a
"soft" Brexit option. As such, the decision by the UK to limit its ties
with the EU (its major trading partner for both exports and imports) to
a greater or lesser extent will result in significant negative
consequences; there is almost unanimous consensus among
economists that this will be the case. The quantitative assessments
emphasize the role of the different mechanisms, but all are clear in
their overall message: the reduction in welfare for UK households will
be potentially significant and long-lasting.
C.Summary
As we have discussed above, economic nationalism as
expressed in the context of President Trump's tariffs on imports from
China and the UK's decision to leave the EU, at face value, appear to
be different. One is specifically anti-trade, the other apparently pro-
' See generally HM GOviRNMNT,Till' FUTuRli RifATIONSIiPBi TWiIEN[TIlI
UNITiD KINGIX)M AND EUROPEAN UNION (2018).
6 5 See HM TRASuRY, supra note 163, at 51.
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trade insofar as "Brexiteers" aim to align the UK with current WTO
MFN tariffs and to foster new trade agreements with non-EU
countries, or in the case of most ardent "Brexiteers," promote
unilateral trade liberalization. However, given the nature of the UK's
current ties with the EU and the increase in trade that has resulted from
EU membership and President Trump's trade war with the country that
has brought about the most significant shift in the global economy in
the last two decades, both cases of economic nationalism result in dis-
integration for the world economy. This dis-integration of currently
established trading relationships is the source of the losses that arise in
the economic assessments of both cases. Thus, while appearing to be
different, both cases reduce the level of trade and, by extension,
economic welfare.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The election of President Trump in November 2016, and the
UK referendum vote in June 2016 to leave the EU have heralded actual
and potential economic shocks to both the US, the UK, and the global
economy. In the case of the US, the Administration's unilateral
targeting of China with import tariffs has prompted retaliation by
China, which in turn has prompted tit-for-tat retaliation by the US,
pushing the two countries closer to an all-out trade war, with negative
spillovers to the world economy. In the case of the UK, the referendum
vote has resulted in a lengthy debate over the form that Brexit should
take, with proposed trading arrangements ranging from a "soft" to a
"hard" Brexit, each with its own expected negative economic
consequences. As described in this article, the China import shock was
a common factor to both events. The economic impact of the shock
created conditions favorable to a populist and nationalist political
response in both the US and the UK, the former focusing on explicitly
protectionist policies designed to put "America first," the latter
focusing on restoring UK political sovereignty and control over its
own trade policies outside of the EU.
However, despite the common cause and nationalist flavor of
both the US and UK responses, on one level, the responses are quite
different. For the US, unilateral imposition of tariffs against China is
precisely what the principle of economic nationalism would predict.
By contrast, whichever Brexit outcome is eventually reached, the UK
is not seeking to unilaterally raise tariffs against its trading partners:
in the case of "soft" Brexit, it will get a continued, albeit less integrated
trading relationship with the EU, while with a "hard" Brexit it will end
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up operating under WTO rules and at the same time seeking to
negotiate new FTAs with other countries. In other words, the UK's
Brexit policy, while a response to economic populism, is clearly not
protectionist. On another level though, the policy choices of the US
and UK are quite similar in the sense that both are seeking to withdraw
from existing trade arrangements in a process that can be termed dis-
integration. The US has unilaterally flouted its multilateral obligations
under the WTO, and withdrawn from the previously negotiated TPP,
while the UK seeks to leave a highly integrated economic arrangement
with the EU. As shown in this article, both choices either are having
or will have significant economic consequences for their respective
economies, as well as the global economy.
